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Accidents and Apathy: The Construction of the
‘Robens Philosophy’ of Occupational Safety and
Health Regulation in Britain, 1961–1974
Christopher Sirrs*
Summary.The1972RobensReport iswidely regardedtohaveprovided theunderlying rationale for the
‘modern’ system of occupational health and safety regulation in Britain, embodied in the Health and
Safety atWork Act (HSWAct) 1974. The HSWAct advanced a new, more flexible system of regulation,
premised on the ideal of self-regulation by industry. This article advances a more nuanced historical
understanding of the Report and its ethos—the ‘Robens philosophy’—than hitherto developed, situat-
ing its assumptions about accidents, regulation and the role of the state in the social, economic andpol-
itical context of Britain in the 1960s and early 1970s. Highlighting the interaction between these trends
and long-established regulatorypractices, thearticleargues that the turn to ‘self-regulation’heraldedby
the Robens Report was highly convincing from a political and regulatory perspective at the time it was
promulgated.
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Introduction
In theearly1970s,Britain’s accident record leftmuchtobedesired for factory inspectors, trade
unionists, safety charities and other bodies concerned about safety at work. Despite a signifi-
cant fall in fatal accidents in factories, workshops and other premises since the beginning of
the twentieth century,by the1970s thereweregrowingconcernsboth inandoutsidegovern-
ment that the existing approach to regulating workplace safety, laid down in the nineteenth
century, had runoutof steam.1Around1,000peopleeachyearwerebeingkilledasa result of
work, and half amillionmorewere being injured—the true figurewas probablymuch higher
than this due to the recognised problem of under-reporting. The government estimated that
Britain’s accident problem cost the nation some 23million lost working days a year, or £200
million: a notable sum in the context of a struggling economy seen to be lagging behind its
major competitors, West Germany and the USA.2
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1Between 1901 and 1910 the fatality rate for factory
workers was 17.5 per 10,000 employees, compared
to 4.5 in the period 1961–70. Department of
Employment, Annual Report of HM Chief Inspector of
Factories 1970, Cmnd. 4758, xiv.
2Lord Robens, Safety and Health at Work. Report of the
Committee. 1970–72, Cmnd. 5034, 1.
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From 1959, the number of reported accidents under the Factories Act, one of the major
statutes governing workers’ safety, steadily increased. The crisis of faith which enveloped
British occupational safety and health regulation motivated the 1964–70 Labour govern-
ment to appoint an independent Committee on Safety and Health at Work in May 1970,
headed by the former chairman of the nationalised coal industry, Lord Alfred Robens (here-
after referred to as the Robens Committee). Charged with reviewing the existing statutory
and voluntary arrangements for worker protection, the Committee controversially con-
cluded in 1972 that ‘apathy’ by employers and employees was primarily to blame for work-
place accidents.3 The Committee believed that excessive or overly detailed regulation could
actually promote apathy, by encouraging employers andworkers to relinquish their respon-
sibilities, and think that safety and health was a matter for the government. This assertion
underpinned the Committee’smain recommendation,whichwas that overall responsibility
for regulating safety and health should be rebalanced, with employers and workers them-
selves assuming the burden.4 The Committee’s argument that ‘a more effectively self-
regulating system’ was needed formed the basis of the Health and Safety at Work etc.
Act (HSWAct), passed in July 1974.5
Remainingonthestatutebookto thisday,over40years later, theHSWAct formsthecoreofa
system that puts voluntary effort, or ‘self-regulation’ by employers and workers at the heart of
accident prevention. Codes of practice, voluntary standards and non-statutory forms of guid-
ance are used in preference to detailed, prescriptive regulation to promote a safe, hygienic
work environment. Written in ‘goal-based’ terms, the law defines the overall objectives to be
achieved, and gives duty holders considerable flexibility in how they comply. Employers are
encouraged to evaluate for themselves the steps needed to complywith the law, an obligation
that extends to the need to carry outwritten risk assessments. Employers and trade unions also
play a primary role in developing new standards: in 1974 they became represented on amajor
new body, the Health and Safety Commission (HSC), which performed regulatory and policy-
making functions previously carried out by government departments. Under the post-1974
framework, the role of the state is to support the conditions that allow self-regulation to be
effective, for instance, by providing technical advice to the HSC and stepping in to prosecute
employers who have failed to comply with the Act.6
Debates about regulation and the nature of the accident problem in the 1960s and early
1970s thus continue to frame the way we conceptualise and address workplace hazards in
Britain today. Yet, to date, the rationale underpinning this influential shift in safety and
health regulation, the so-called ‘Robens philosophy’, remains to be given dedicated schol-
arly attention. Focusing on the response toworkplace accidents in the British government in
the 1960s and early 1970s, in association with trade unions, employers’ associations and
safety charities, this article offers the first detailed accountof thedevelopments in regulatory
thinking and practice that underpinned this pivotal transformation. Drawing upon pub-
lished and archival material belonging to key actors, including the Ministry of Labour
(MOL), Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Robens Committee itself, the article explores
why the Robens Committee felt the need at this juncture to emphasise a turn to greater
3Ibid.
4Ibid., 7.
5Ibid., 12.
6Since 1975 these functions have been performed by in-
spectors and other officials working for the Health and
Safety Executive (HSE).
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self-regulation and non-prescriptive law, rather than more detailed regulation or more vig-
orous enforcement of the existing legal provisions.7
Throughout the article, the focus of the analysis is the conditions that shaped the shift in
form of regulation, rather than Robens’ related proposals regarding its scope, content and
institutional machinery. Emphasis is also placed on ‘safety’ rather than ‘health’, reflecting
the contemporary preoccupations of the Robens Report and bias of the British government.
As oneMOL official claimed in 1960: ‘In practice we classify thework as “safety, health and
welfare”, which is a more realistic appraisal of its balance, both from the official and indus-
trial point of view.’8 However, it should be noted that Robens’ arguments relating to occu-
pational health and medicine closely followed his prescriptions on self-regulation and the
readjustment of statutory effort.
A Contentious Logic
This article is not the first to use the term ‘Robens philosophy’. Since 1974, the term has
been widely used to refer to the complex of assumptions and beliefs underlying the
Robens Committee’s recommendations; lately, socio-legal theorists such as Steve Tombs
and Robert Baldwin have popularised the term in their analyses of the British health and
safety system, an approach that has been adopted in several other countries, including
Canada.9 However, while the impact of the Robens philosophy on the subsequent shape
and success of British health and safety regulation has been much discussed and criticised
by these theorists, to date there has been little focus on the wider historical conditions that
shaped the philosophy’s owndevelopment: the factors that supported a greater focus on vol-
untarismand ‘self-regulation’ at thismoment, as opposed to greater statutory intervention or
stronger enforcement. The Committee’s views have largely been interpreted in isolation.
Criticisms of the Robens philosophy have centred on the Committee’s alleged ‘mistaken
analysis’ that resulted in it adopting faulty or naive assumptions about regulation.10 Baldwin,
for example, has argued how the Committee’s ‘consensual’ approach, or desire to seek pro-
active cooperation between employers andworkers in accident prevention, ‘resulted in a dis-
torted view of rules and enforcement—almost a starry-eyed one.’11 Robens’ assumption that
there was a natural ‘identity of interest’ between employers and workers in eliminating acci-
dentswaschallengedbycontemporarycritics suchasPatrickKinnersly,whoargued that itwas
‘adangerousmythwhichdovetailswith the fiction thatmost accidents are causedby careless-
ness and can therefore be eliminated if everyone “pulls together”’.12
An associated view is that by embedding these assumptions into regulatory practice, the
Robens philosophy served to weaken British health and safety law. Tombs andWhyte have
argued that the Robens philosophy provided the blueprint for deregulatory efforts by the
7Archival records of these organisations are kept at The
National Archives (TNA) inKew, Surrey (for government
records), and theModern Records Centre at theUniver-
sity of Warwick for the TUC and BEC/CBI. For archival
records of the Robens Committee, see TNA LAB 96.
8TNA LAB 14/934, K. Kenney, memo, 15 September
1960.
9Steve Tombs and David Whyte, ‘A Deadly Consensus:
Worker Safety and Regulatory Degradation under
New Labour’, British Journal of Criminology, 2010, 50,
46–65, 47, 50; Steve Tombs, ‘Enforcing Safety Law in
Britain: Beyond Robens’, Risk Management, 2001, 3,
29–41; Robert Baldwin, Rules and Government
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 127.
10Baldwin, Rules and Government, 140.
11Ibid.
12Patrick Kinnersly, The Hazards of Work: How to Fight
Them (London: Pluto Press, 1973), 10; Baldwin, Rules
and Government, 133–4.
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British government in the 1980s and 1990s.13 Robens’ emphasis on consensus and ‘tripart-
ism’ (the involvement of government, industry and trade union representatives) to promul-
gatehealthand safety policy, they contend, exposed the system to ‘regulatory degradation’.
This is because if one of the key ‘partners’ fails to fulfil its obligations—for example, if budget-
ary cutsmean that theHSE fails to properly enforce health and safety in theworkplace—then
Robens’ self-regulatorymodel collapses. Similarly,Matthias Beck andCharlesWoolfson have
highlighted the rhetorical parallels between the Robens philosophy and deregulatory agenda
ofNewLabour.14What is clear is that these socio-legal scholars havebeenmotivatedby anor-
mative concernaboutwhathealthand safety regulation shouldbe like, orhealth andsafetyas
an example of government regulation, as opposed to an historical concern about how and
why the philosophy emerged and took hold in British regulatory practice.
Here also, consensus and tripartism are often seen to have undermined the safety and
health of workers, rather than promote it. David Marsh and Wyn Grant have argued that
on the basis of deteriorating relations between the TUC, the CBI and the government in
the development of economic policy in the late 1960s and 1970s, ‘there can be little confi-
dence that a genuinely tripartite system exist[ed]’.15 In contrast, several socio-legal studies
have emphasised the relative harmonyof tripartite relations in safety andhealth, in compari-
son toother areas of industrial relations and countries such as theUSA.16As SandraDawson
et al. note, safety and health represented ‘a relatively stable framework of… law across an
economically and politically turbulent period.’17
Amonghistorians, criticismof theRobensphilosophy ismore recent, corresponding to the
growing interest in occupational health, illness and disease over the past decade. Arthur
McIvor has highlighted the Report’s emphasis on ‘apathy’ as a strategy for ‘blaming the
victim’ (i.e. theworker) for industrial accidents, anargument that takes its cue fromKinnersly
and a critical thread of expert commentary dating back to the Report’s publication.18 Health
and safety being a highly politicised field of inquiry, linked to concerns about employment
rights andworkers’ compensation, these commentaries haveoften focusedon theCommit-
tee’s treatment ofworkers to the exclusion of its related focus onmanagement. The Robens
Committee foundmanagement to be equally if notmore culpable for accidents, setting the
behavioural norm for the entire organisation.19
Whether or not the Robens philosophy is valid, conceptually or in practice, it is necessary
to understand how and why the philosophy emerged and gained currency if we are to
understand how British health and safety regulation developed after 1974. However, the
post-1974 history of health and safety regulation has yet to receive significant attention
13Tombs and Whyte, ‘A Deadly Consensus’.
14Matthias Beck and CharlesWoolfson, ‘The Regulation
ofHealthandSafety inBritain: FromOldLabour toNew
Labour’, Industrial Relations Journal, 2000, 31, 35–49.
15David Marsh and Wyn Grant, ‘Tripartism: Reality or
Myth?’, Government and Opposition, 1977, 12, 201.
16See GrahamWilson, The Politics of Safety and Health:
Occupational Safety and Health in the United States
and Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
17Sandra Dawson, Paul Willman et al., Safety at Work:
The Limits of Self-Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988).
18Arthur McIvor, Working Lives: Work in Britain since
1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 174;
Kinnersly, The Hazards of Work; Theo Nichols and
Pete Armstrong, Safety or Profit: Industrial Accidents
& The Conventional Wisdom (Bristol: Falling Wall
Press, 1973); Anthony Woolf, ‘Robens Report—The
Wrong Approach’, Industrial Law Journal, 1973, 2,
88–95.
19Robens, Safety and Health at Work, 14.
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from historians, despite the growing interest in health and safety in general.20 Historians
have continued to preoccupy themselves with efforts to prevent accidents and diseases in
particular industries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and, following an
appeal firstmade in PaulWeindling’s 1985edited volume, The Social History ofOccupation-
al Health, have emphasised the experiences and agency of workers.21 The wider context of
regulation, apart from particular interventions in these sectors, has been largely ignored.
There are several possible reasons for this neglect, including that the prevailing social-
historical approach has moved away from simplistic legislative or institutional histories in
favour of more nuanced analyses focusing on the contestation of accidents and disease
at particular workplaces.22
A focus on health and safety at the national or systemic level can be equally as nuanced if
one focuses on the wider historical contingencies that promoted one particular approach
above another. The following account highlights how, at the time the Robens Committee
published its findings in 1972, a turn to greater voluntarism and self-regulation was most
convincing from a political and regulatory perspective, seemingly being both conceptually
sound and pragmatic to implement. Economic and political developments over the 1960s
provided fertile ground for a regulatory and political reaction against prescriptive regulation
as a tool for promotingworkplace safety, and reinforced certain conceptual biases inherent
in thepre-1974enforcement of health and safety law. By the endof the1960s, they encour-
aged theBritish government to undertake a fundamental reappraisal of its role in regulating
workplace safety.
British Health and Safety Regulation before 1974
Prior to the HSWAct, which extended health and safety protection to virtually all workers,
British health and safety legislation was highly fragmented. Nine acts and over 500 regula-
tions governed the safety, health and welfare of workers in particular industries and occu-
pations, and extended control over specific hazards, such as ionising radiation. However,
while someworkplaces, such as chemical plants,were subject tomultiple andoften conflict-
ing requirements, others, such as hospitals and schools, were excluded from legal coverage
altogether.23 Some8millionBritishworkers, almost a thirdof theentireworkingpopulation,
received no statutory protection from accidents and illnesses resulting from work.24
This complexwebof law followeda legal template set in the early nineteenth century. The
precedent for statutory intervention in working conditions was set not by a concern about
the safety andhealthofworkers per se, but by theworking conditions of pauper apprentices
in textile mills. From 1802, protective legislation expanded across a widening sphere of in-
dustrial activity, drawing in more and more industrial workers. In the process, it became
more detailed.25 The first ‘safety’provisions, requiring the fencing of dangerousmachinery,
20E.g. Vicky Long,TheRise and Fall of theHealthy Factory
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); P. W. J.
Bartrip, The Home Office and the Dangerous Trades
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002); Arthur McIvor and
Ronald Johnston, Miner’s Lung: A History of Dust
Disease in British Coal Mining (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2007).
21PaulWeindling, ed.,TheSocialHistoryofOccupational
Health (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 3–8.
22Roger Cooter and Bill Luckin, eds,Accidents in History:
Injuries, Fatalities and Social Relations (Amsterdam:
Rodopi, 1997), 2.
23Robens, Safety and Health at Work, 5–10.
24Health and Safety Commission, Report 1974–76
(London: HMSO, 1977), 2–3.
25Department of Employment and Productivity, Annual
Report of HM Chief Inspector of Factories 1968,
Cmnd. 4146, 2–3.
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appeared in the 1844 Factory Act; towards the end of the nineteenth century, legisla-
tion expanded to encompass the health of workers in the ‘dangerous trades’, such as
lead smelting.26
One of the contributing factors towards this fragmentation was the reactivity of British
law. According to the economist Sidney Webb, health and safety legislation was ‘a typical
example of English practical empiricism’, considering it proceeded from ‘no abstract
theory of social justice or the rights of man’ (unlike continental Napoleonic law), but
instead responded pragmatically to particular problems as they emerged.27 Industrial disas-
ters, for instance, frequently caught political and public attention andwere swiftly followed
by remedial legislation: as late as 1969, the Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act advanced new
legal requirements for colliery spill tips, following the catastrophic landslide at Aberfan,
South Wales in 1966 which killed 144 people.28
This piecemeal extension of legislation contributed to several legal and administrative dif-
ficulties which, by the 1960s, undermined regulation at the level of the workplace, industry
and national policy. Many of the laws on the statute book were vague and confusing, diffi-
cult for civil servants to unravel, let alone employers.29 Others were hopelessly out of date
and reflected industrial circumstances that had long since passed. Further, with several
inspectorates in existence, each concentrating on a particular industry or class of hazard,
administrative conflicts emerged where it was difficult to tell which Act or which inspector-
ate had precedence.30
The largest and oldest of the inspectorates in existence before 1974 was the Factory In-
spectorate, founded in 1833 as part of the Home Office. Of particular importance to the
Robens philosophy was the ‘conciliatory’ approach of these inspectors towards enforce-
ment. Peter Bartrip has shown that while the first factory inspectors had significant legal
powers by twenty-first-century standards, including the ability to enter premises at any
time, their readiness to prosecute declined over the nineteenth century. They fell back on
a principle of ‘negotiated compliance’, whereby inspectors persuaded employers to meet
legal requirements, rather than coercing them. This was driven by several concerns: the
need to efficiently allocate scarce resources; an unwillingness to prosecute middle-class
businessmen,many ofwhomwere alsomagistrates; and the location of ‘a conflict-oriented
inspectorate operating within a consensus-oriented department’—the Home Office being
more amenable to ‘passivity, quietism and accommodation’.31 The socio-legal scholar
W. Carson has noted that the very existence of the Factory Inspectorate as a statutory en-
forcement body, separate from thepolice, acted to ‘conventionalise’ factory crime, suggest-
ing itwasa lesserorderof criminal offence.32Whatever the reasonsbehind this reluctance to
prosecute, the principle of ‘negotiated compliance’ remained alive and well in the early
1970s. As the Chief Inspector, John Plumbe explained in 1970, prosecution could be
counter-constructive if over-rigorously applied:
26Robens, Safety and Health at Work, appx. 5; Bartrip,
The Home Office and the Dangerous Trades, 9.
27Robens, Safety and Health at Work, 5.
28Ibid., 4.
29Ibid., 6–11
30Ibid.
31Bartrip, The Home Office and the Dangerous Trades,
37–42; Keith Hawkins, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution
Decision-Making in a Regulatory Agency (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 18–19.
32W. Carson, ‘The Conventionalization of Early Factory
Crime’, International Journal of the Sociology of Law,
1979, 7, 41–60.
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It is no more thinkable that there should be so many Inspectors that one could be per-
manently stationed at every works than that, say, every fifth motor car should be a
police car to enforce the Road Traffic Acts.… If a situation ever arose in which the In-
spectorate were to attempt rigid enforcement of everything that could be driven
through the Courts, so that industry ceased to turn to it for advice and guidance,
the standards of safety, health and welfare set over the years in the great majority of
workplaces would indeed suffer.33
Thus, advice and persuasion continued to be the dominant instruments bywhich the British
state regulated health and safety well into the latter half of the twentieth century. In an ex-
tensivemonographon regulatory practice, the socio-legal scholar KeithHawkins has shown
how this philosophy persists under the present-day HSE.34
Voluntary approaches toworkplace safety before1974, such as safetymanagement, also
informed theRobensphilosophy. Safetymanagement as apractice andprofessionemerged
in many British workplaces following the First World War, when it became promoted by
organisations such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) and later,
theBritishSafetyCouncil. Theaimof safetymanagementwas toprevent industrial accidents
by promoting safety as part of the everyday running of business, for example by promot-
ing training schemes, safety committees and the use of professional safety officers.35 As
described below, while these approaches were not new, they became increasingly central
to tackling workplace accidents in the 1960s, as inspectors and policy makers grew more
convinced that the existing regulatory approach, based on an ‘ever-expanding body of
legal regulations’, had faltered.36
Certainly, by the end of the 1960s inspectors and policy makers believed there was a
growing mismatch between the kinds of response they thought was necessary to confront
accidents, and the kinds of response required by legislation. Existing health and safety law
focused on the physical conditions and hazards of work, as opposed to the social or organ-
isational factors that scientific models and research increasingly showed to be at the root of
accidents.37TheFactoriesAct1961, for instance, laiddowndetailedminimumrequirements
for such matters as temperature and ventilation in the workplace, but had nothing to say
about such matters as the on-going monitoring of safety performance.38
Despite this ‘physical’ emphasis, by the early 1960s inspectors were outspoken about
social and organisational factors, calling for arrangements to encourage safe and healthy
systems of work and for workers to participate in safety management. Trade unions and
safety charities demanded that safety organisations should be established at workplace
and industry level as a structured response to theaccidentproblem.Contemporary econom-
ic and political developments amplified these concerns, placing them at the heart of the
Robens Committee’s proposals for ‘a more effectively self-regulating system’.39
33Department of Employment and Productivity, Annual
Report of HM Chief Inspector of Factories 1969,
Cmnd. 4461, xii.
34Hawkins, Law as Last Resort, vii.
35Richard T. Booth and Anthony J. Boyle, ‘Occupational
accident prevention’, in Kerry Gardiner and J. Malcolm
Harrington, eds, Occupational Hygiene, 3rd edn
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 404–5.
36Robens, Safety and Health at Work, 7.
37Ibid., 8; e.g. National Institute of Industrial Psychology,
2000 Accidents: A Shop Floor Study of their Causes
(London: National Institute of Industrial Psychology,
1971).
38Robens, Safety and Health at Work, 8.
39Ibid., 12.
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Safety Consciousness and Industrial Self-help
This movement in regulatory attention from the ‘physical’ to ‘social’ environment of the
workplace was not a new phenomenon in the early 1960s, but had been on-going for
several decades. Not least, the continuing development of the safety profession, spear-
headed by organisations such as RoSPA, increased the profile of safety management in
many firms.40 As early as 1927, the government encouraged the setting up of works
safety committees, bringing together worker and management representatives to discuss
safety problems.41 In 1956 theNational Joint AdvisoryCouncil, a tripartite body bringing to-
gether trade union and employer representatives to advise theMinister of Labour on indus-
trial relations, stressed the importance of safety organisation and demanded an increase in
safety committees.42 These developments urged industry to take greater responsibility for
safety and take proactive steps to prevent accidents, instead of addressing hazards after
an accident had occurred or relying on reactive statutory intervention (e.g. inspection).
Despite these approaches, in 1961 the Chief Inspector of Factories, T. W. McCullough,
painted a grim picture of industrial safety organisation:
Toomany firms still have no safety organisationwhatever, orwhere it exists it is ineffec-
tual.…Many employers appear to rely on H.M. Inspectors to deal with the safety pro-
blems in their works. Inspectors are, of course, always ready to give advice on the best
means of promoting safety and health, but responsibility in these matters rests on the
occupier. Only through better realisation of that responsibility leading in turn to better
safety organisation at the place of work… is substantial progress to be expected.43
A sharp rise in industrial accidents had by this point called into question industry’s commit-
ment to accident prevention. Reversing the downward trend of previous years, the number
of reported accidents under the Factories Act increased by 15 per cent between 1958 and
1961.44 The number of accidents suffered by young persons was particular grounds for
concern to factory inspectors, suggesting many employers were neglecting their duty to
train and supervise new entrants to the workplace—an essential requirement at a time
when British productivity was falling (see below).45 While the overall number of fatal acci-
dents fell, this sudden increase generated significant political attention both within and
outside the British government.
In the ‘industrial self-help campaign’, the British government launched a drive to encour-
age industry to develop safety organisation. One element of this campaign was the MOL’s
decision to co-operate with the TUC and BEC in developing central accident prevention
organisations in industries where they were absent, such as shipbuilding.46 The ostensible
benefit of such organisations was their help in collating accident statistics, providing guid-
ance material tailored to the industry, and operating training schemes.47 Other forms of
40Booth and Anthony J. Boyle, ‘Occupational accident
prevention’, 404; Robens, Safety and Health at
Work, 17.
41HC Deb 11 July 1966 vol. 731 col. 955.
42Ministry of Labour and National Service, Industrial Ac-
cident Prevention. A Report of the Industrial Safety
Sub-Committee of the National Joint Advisory
Council (London: HMSO, 1956), 9–13.
43Ministryof Labour.Annual Report ofHMChief Inspect-
or of Factories 1961, Cmnd. 1816, 8.
44Ibid., 7.
45E.g. Ministry of Labour, Annual Report of HMChief In-
spector of Factories 1964, Cmnd. 2724, 18.
46Ibid., 8.
47TNA LAB 14/1197, ‘Safety and Health’, BEC Bulletin
117, 28 February 1962, 2.
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safety organisation encouraged by the government included industrial health and hygiene
services, workers’ safety representatives and professional safety officers. From 1965, the
government funded RoSPA to help develop safety organisation on a regional basis through-
out Britain.48
These interventions were framed by the British government as part of a campaign to in-
culcate ‘safety consciousness’ in industry. McCullough summed up its paternalistic basis
in 1963 when he wrote, ‘Safety consciousness… is a form of foresight or alertness, a
quality of mind which has to be developed and nurtured.’49 Hence, the British government
and its inspectors reliedupon strategies suchas education, advice andpersuasion toencour-
age ‘self-help’, delivered through a range of media including face-to-face advice, safety
posters, publications, exhibitions and conferences. One such conference was the joint
conference on industrial safety organised by the TUC and BEC in November 1962, which
precipitated several joint efforts to stimulate safety organisation over the decade.50 The In-
dustrial Health and Safety Centre onHorseferry Road, London, originally opened in 1927 as
theHomeOffice IndustrialMuseum, also served as a forum for the education of visitors until
financial constraints forced its closure in 1980.51
Importantly, these various interventions did not stem from any fundamental desire by the
government to legislate, although the sluggish response of industry to the call for safety
committees later prompted the Labour government to try putting them on a statutory
footing. Rather, taking their cue from the conciliatory enforcement philosophy of the
Factory Inspectorate, and the ‘voluntarist’ stanceof the1960sConservativeandLabourgov-
ernments towards industrial relations, they were driven by a desire to help industry meet its
obligations. Committed to collective bargaining with a minimum of statutory interference,
the TUC also felt that safety organisation was best pursued by voluntary means. While its
Social Insurance and Industrial Welfare Committee was keen that the government should
boost the number of factory inspectors and strengthen the law, it also accepted that ‘legis-
lation [alone] couldnot invariablypreventaccidentsand that itwas verynecessary toeducate
people to work safely.’52
The industrial self-help campaign was based upon an implicit belief about occupational
accidents. Factory inspectors and others in the safety movement had long considered
there to be a ‘human factor’ to such accidents, an idea thatwas encapsulated in contempor-
ary scientific models of accident causation.53 At the extreme, this idea was reflected in the
psychological construct of ‘accident proneness’ that crystallised in the 1920s and 1930s.54
However, by the early 1960s, British factory inspectors accepted that the vast majority of
accidents, especially those within the so-called ‘Big Five’, included an intrinsic ‘human’ di-
mension that resisted legislative control. The ‘Big Five’, accident statistics revealed, included
48Ministryof Labour,Annual Report ofHMChief Inspect-
or of Factories 1965, Cmnd. 3080, 8.
49Ministryof Labour,Annual Report ofHMChief Inspect-
or of Factories 1962, Cmnd. 2128, 56.
50TUC archive MSS.29B/146/2, ‘Reducing Accidents at
Work. Minister of Labour Urges “All Out Effort by In-
dustry”’, 13 November 1962.
51Long, The Rise and Fall of the Healthy Factory, 64; HC
Deb 06 May 1980 vol. 984 col. 5W.
52TUC archive MSS.292B/146/1, ‘Prevention of Indus-
trial Accidents’, report of meeting with Minister of
Labour, 22 January 1962, 2.
53E.g. H W. Heinrich, Industrial Accident Prevention: A
Scientific Approach, 3rd edn (NewYork:McGraw-Hill,
1950).
54John Burnham, Accident Prone: A History of Technol-
ogy, Psychology and Misfits of the Machine Age
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,
2009).
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accidents resulting frommanual handling, the use of hand tools, falls from heights, strikes
against objects and strikes from falling objects. In 1962, they accounted for almost
two-thirds of all reported factory accidents.55 As the Chief Inspector of Factories,
R. K. Christy observed in 1964,
While a proportion of the ‘Big Five’ accidents may be connected with breaches of
factory legislation, experience has shown that the majority occur in circumstances
which cannot readily be controlled by legislation, for example lack of attention to
good industrial housekeeping.… The errors arising from human behaviour unlike
the requirement to fence a dangerous machine do not, except to a very limited
extent, lend themselves to control by legislation.56
John Burnham has argued that the psychological concept of ‘accident proneness’ receded
into the popular imagination by the 1960s, caught between the rise of the new epidemi-
ology on the one hand (the concept of aggregating individuals into risk groups), and
safety engineering on the other (the use of physical controls such as machine guards to
prevent accidents for entire groups of workers).57 Among British factory inspectors,
however, engineering approaches to workplace safety were in themselves being called
into question around this time. Revised models of accident causation emerging from insur-
ance, such as Frank E. Bird’s ‘total loss control’, showed that the accident was the tip of the
iceberg ofwidermanagerial or organisational failings in the firm.58Over the 1960s, the idea
that certain types of accident remained stubbornly resistant to legislation fuelled growing
suspicions among inspectors that first, the vast majority of accidents preventable by engin-
eeringmeans had already been prevented, and second, that the prescriptive legislation out-
lining these measures was suffering from diminishing returns.59 With these diminishing
returns, inspectors claimed, the solution to accidents was not more regulation, more in-
spectors or more enforcement, but a more concerted effort by industry itself. As the Chief
Inspector, Bryan Harvey argued, ‘Some of the traditional hazards of the physical environ-
ment have been brought under control over the past years.Whatwemust now increasingly
tackle is the social or management environment which may underlie poor safety perform-
ance.’60 Sitting in the early 1970s, the Robens Committee was strongly influenced by this
idea of a ‘safety plateau’, suggesting that the future emphasis of the state should not be
the further proliferation of regulation, but a renewed focus on encouraging and coordinat-
ing voluntary effort.61
An even greater spike in the number of recorded accidents under the Factories Act in
1964, however, forced the Labour government and TUC to reappraise this strategy for pro-
moting safety. The total number of 268,648 accidents reported that year represented an in-
crease of almost a third above1963, and thehighest reported figure since the SecondWorld
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War (Figure 1).62 While the causes of this increase were unknown—improved reporting
since the start of the industrial self-help campaign, an upswing in industrial production,
and the severe winter of 1962–63 all contributed—the Parliamentary Secretary to theMin-
istry of Labour, Ernest Thornton,was forced to conclude ‘[I]t is reformweneed—anewspirit
of determination throughout the country to stop the human suffering and waste of our
scarce manpower resources which these appalling accident figures represent.’63 He
added, ‘I think we must appreciate that accidents of this kind cannot easily be reached by
legislation, or prevented by factory inspectors. They can, however, be prevented if manage-
ment and workers develop an active safety consciousness.’64
This new and more worrying rise in accidents followed reports suggesting that a signifi-
cant section of industry had either wilfully ignored, or was unaware of, its statutory obliga-
tion to report accidents. In the early 1960s, the government observed that claims to
industrial injuries benefit outweighed the number of non-fatal accidents reported to the
Factory Inspectorate.65 To evaluate this discrepancy, in October 1962 theMOL, in conjunc-
tionwith theMinistryofPensionsandNational Insurance, carriedouta surveycomparing the
level of reported accidents under the Factories Act with claims for industrial injuries benefit,
adjusting for accidents that were not reportable. The survey revealed that less than 60 per
cent of all notifiable accidents were being reported.66 A follow-up enquiry two years later
revealed that despite efforts in the interim, suchas the sendingof a flyer to factoryoccupiers,
industryhadmade littleprogress.Onaverage, across the FactoriesAct, 40per centofall acci-
dents were never notified. In smaller factories, those employing fewer than 100 people, a
Fig. 1 Work accidents in Great Britain, 1961–1970, in premises subject to the Factories Act 1961.
Source: Robens, Safety and Health at Work, 161–2.
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shocking 50 per cent of all accidentswere never notified to the government: these premises
employed a third of Britain’s factory workforce.67
The sheer level of under-reporting exposed by the surveys revealed that despite the self-
help campaign, many employers were still uninformed about their duties. This neglect of
safety was not confined to accident reporting: as previously mentioned, since 1956 the
MOL, in association with the TUC and other organisations, had attempted to increase the
number of safety committees in firms across the country.Here too, a survey in 1964 revealed
that industry’s promises could not be relied upon: the number of safety committees in the
largest, and supposedly better organised firms had actually decreased since 1956, rather
than increased.68
It was at this point that the TUC, which had previously supported the voluntary establish-
ment of safety committees, called for their statutory compulsion in a 1964 resolution.69 The
BEC, however, opposed any such question. While they were open to joint consultation
between workers andmanagement in principle, they argued that imposing a legal require-
ment would undermine voluntary efforts already underway, and encourage employers to
meet, rather than exceed, legal requirements.70 This was a line the BEC’s successor, the
CBI, repeated to the Robens Committee.71 Examining the previous assurances made by
industry, however, the MOL believed that industry’s commitment was ‘open to serious
doubt’.72 During a Parliamentary question on works safety committees in 1966, the MOL
warned that
Progress in the past has… been extremely disappointing.… [U]nless there is satisfac-
tory progress over the next few years in the setting up of joint works safety committees
on a voluntary basis, [the Minister of Labour] will feel obliged, when the next major
revision of the Factories Act takes place, to seek power to require the establishment
of machinery for joint consultation in appropriate cases.73
In response to this threat, thenumberof safety committees subsequently increasedby69per
cent, from 5,826 in 1966 to 9,847 in 1969.74
That same year, the Employed Persons (Health and Safety) Bill, presented by the Secretary
of State for Employment and Productivity, Barbara Castle, attempted to legislate for safety
committees in Britishworkplaces.75 The Bill provided for recognised trade unions to appoint
worker safety representatives in premises where 10 or more persons were employed. In
premises where over 100 persons were employed, the employer was required to establish
a safety committee if the safety representatives requested. However, this Bill was lost
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following thedissolutionofParliament in1970,pending thegeneral election. Itwasnotuntil
1977, following the HSW Act, that recognised trade unions gained the right to appoint
safety representatives, in one of the few significant departures from the Robens Commit-
tee’s recommendations.76
By the end of 1960s, therefore, efforts to improve industrial safety organisation by volun-
tary means alone had demonstrably failed, requiring the threat of legislation to work.
Despite this, the Robens Committee, sitting between 1970 and 1972, did not recommend
the further extension of prescriptive legislation, or an increase in prosecution. Instead, it
recommended a turn to goal-setting legislation and greater self-regulation by industry. In
relation to safety committees, Robens avoided prescribing any particular arrangement, pre-
ferring instead a general requirement for employers to consult their workers.77 The reason
for this turn, aswill become apparent, was not only that Robens bought the CBI’s argument
that legislating for joint consultation would undermine voluntary efforts, but also that his
thinking was captured by the conciliatory approach of the Factory Inspectorate and its
talk of diminishing regulatory returns.
Safety, Productivity and Self-help
In addition to accidents, economic and political concerns in the 1960s promoted themove-
ment of regulatory attention onto safety organisation. Fears about Britain’s lowproductivity
compared to its competitors, and its increasingly disorderly industrial relations, persuaded
the government to intervene ever more closely in work activity. Such concerns helped
promote, by 1970, a growing synergy between questions of safety, productivity and self-
help in regulatory discourse, one that supported the emergent Robens philosophy.
The1960swas not the first time that questions of productivity had encouraged the British
government to intervene in industrial safety, health and welfare. Historians have written at
lengthabouthowthemilitaristic needsof theBritish state in theFirst andSecondWorldWars
acted to focus political attention on the needs of the industrial worker. In the SecondWorld
War, for example, newordersweremadeunder the FactoriesAct, introducing requirements
for such matters as lighting, canteens and first-aid facilities.78
In the 1960s, it was not military competition but global trade that highlighted the eco-
nomic costs of poor health and safety. Over the decade Britain’s share of world trade
declined, from around 20 per cent in 1955 to 13 per cent in 1970.79 In 1965, around the
time accident statistics had called into question industry’s commitment towork safety, com-
parative levels of worker output per capita were 32 per cent higher inWest Germany, and a
remarkable 84 per cent higher in the USA.80 Britain’s declining productivity resulted in a
growing trade deficit, culminating in HaroldWilson’s decision to devalue sterling in Novem-
ber 1967. Within this context, the costs of absenteeism, sickness and injury resulting from
industrial accidents and disease became increasingly contentious. In 1967 the number of
working days lost per year to occupational accidents and disease was reckoned at
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23 million, a figure that was ten times the comparable number lost to strikes, both official
and ‘wildcat’.81
In an era of full employment and political concerns about inflation, the key to industrial
productivity was seen to lie in improving industrial efficiency, of which safety was a core
component (thus Thornton’s assertion, above, about the ‘waste of… scarce manpower
resources’ that the accident figures represented).82 Industrial training was one area
where safety and productivity needs converged, and over the 1960s the government
spent significant effort in attempting to promote safety in the curricula of industrial training
schemes.83
The synergy between safety, self-help and productivity was also reinforced in industrial
relations, which likewise painted a picture of a disorganised and inefficient work environ-
ment. Between 1956 and 1966, the number of strikes outside mining increased by 142
per cent.84 The growing problem of strikes motivated the 1964–70 Labour government
to appoint the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer’s Associations (Donovan
Commission) in 1965.85 Itsmembershipwasdrawn fromboth sidesof industry and included
Lord Robens, then in his position as chairman of the National Coal Board. Its 1968 report
concluded that there were ‘two systems’ of industrial relations in Britain, in fundamental
conflict with one another. There was the ‘formal system’, comprising official institutions
and industry-wide collective agreements, and there was the ‘informal system’, comprising
the actual behaviour of shop stewards,managements andothers on the ground.86 The fun-
damental problem with British industrial relations, the Commission argued, was that the
‘informal system’was dominating, and thus undermining, the ‘formal system’.87 Their pro-
posed solution, in some respects analogous to the Robens Committee’s later recommenda-
tions, was statutory intervention to strengthen and support voluntary arrangements
regulating industrial relations at workplace level. The Donovan Commission included
safety as a central objective in its proposals, providing mechanisms for ‘regular joint discus-
sion of measures to promote safety at work’.88 Barbara Castle’s move to legislate for joint
consultation after 1966 was thus intimately woven with this wider trend towards greater
statutory intervention in industrial relations.
Robens himself was in a unique position to bring these ideas about safety, productivity
and self-help together. As chairman of the National Coal Board, Robens experienced first-
hand the shortcomings of the existing regulatory system at Aberfan, and led a nationalised
industrywith a relativelywell-developed approach to safety compared to other industries.89
As a member of the Donovan Commission, Robens learnt how disorganised workplaces
promoted industrial unrest and undermined national productivity. As a former trade
union official, Labour MP and Minister of Labour in the 1950s, Robens was a passionate
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advocator of industrial safety, recommending that legislation should be extended to offices,
shops and other non-industrial workplaces.90
In 1970, just before he became chairman of the Committee on Safety and Health at
Work, Robens published an insightful book that demonstrates how these considerations
informed his regulatory philosophy. InHuman Engineering, Robens proposed a comprehen-
sive overhaul of British industry, boosting national competitiveness by exploiting ‘the vast po-
tential of the manpower of this country, the native genius and natural initiative’.91 Robens
cited inefficient management as the overriding explanation for Britain’s poor economic per-
formance. The main reason Britain was uncompetitive was because British industry could
not efficiently utilise its labour.92 Poor safety performance signified a badly managed work-
place, whereworkers had little say in themanagerial decisions affecting their work. Arrange-
ments that therefore encouraged worker participation, and facilitated safety as a matter of
good business practice, should therefore be strengthened as amatter of explicit government
policy. Statutory regulation, in his view, encouraged the notion that responsibility for safety
rested with the government, not industry. In an evocative quote, suggesting that Robens
thought about redistributing responsibility for safety before the Committee on Safety and
Health at Work was even established, he wrote: ‘Not until wise managements recognise
the importance of safety at the place of employment as an integral part of efficiency will
the requirement for inspectors and enforcement virtually disappear.’93 As the preceding ana-
lysis has revealed, such an opinion reflected the stance of the bodies responsible for adminis-
tering safety and health legislation before 1974. Robens now carried these ideas and beliefs
into his deliberations on the Committee on Safety and Health at Work.
The Committee on Safety and Health at Work
Thedecision toappoint an independent committee to reviewhowBritain’shealthandsafety
systemoperatedwas taken strategically. In 1967, theMinister of Labour, RayGunter, began
consultations with trade unions, employers’ associations and other bodies on theMinistry’s
plans to revise and consolidate the Factories Act 1961andOffices, Shops andRailway Prem-
isesAct 1963.94Despiteproposals submitted inDecember1967,however,whichenvisaged
anAct of amuchwider application than previous statutes, as of 1969 therewas little agree-
ment between the parties on how to proceed.
Barbara Castle and her colleagues at the Department of Employment and Productivity
inherited these proposals when the MOL was dissolved in 1968. Castle believed that the
1967 proposals did not go far enough to remedy the deficiencies of the existing regulatory
system, such as its exclusion of many groups of workers and members of the public at risk
from work activity. The government too had lost confidence in the proposals, deciding
in January 1969 to rule out comprehensive legislation in the 1969–70 Parliamentary
session.95 Although Castle proceeded with her own interim legislation, the Employed
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Persons (Health and Safety) Bill, this focused on just two of themany issues requiring atten-
tion by the end of the 1960s, joint consultation and proposals for a new Employment
Medical Advisory Service. Castle thus appointed a committee largely as a device to break
through this impasse. In anote toher colleagues,Castlewrotehowasmall committee, com-
posed of a handful of members, would be more likely to produce quick results and conclu-
sions palatable to both trade unions and employers.96 In a letter to the General Secretary of
the TUC, Victor Feather, Castle wrote:
The conclusion I have come to is that thematter can be satisfactorily dealt with only by
having a high-level outside enquiry. I have in mind a small body—perhaps a chairman
and 3 or 4members—whowould, without going into the detail of the existing legisla-
tion, take a general look at the way the present system works right across the field.97
TheCommittee onSafety andHealth atWorkwas duly appointedon29May1970, andhad
its first meeting on the 23 June. The idea that Robens should be appointed chairman came
from Victor Feather, suggesting that Robens retained credibility among the trade union
movement despite the reputational damage inflicted by Aberfan.98 In addition to Robens,
fellow members included the law professor, John Wood; the management consultant,
Anne Shaw; the Conservative MP, Mervyn Pike; the radiologist Sir Brian Windeyer; the
trade unionist Sydney Robinson and the industrialist, George Beeby.99
Between 1970 and 1972, the Committee collected evidence from over 200 individuals
and organisations concernedwith safety and health atwork, including government depart-
ments, trade unions, employers’ associations and insurers. The Committee embarked on
several industrial visits to see how the systemworked in practice, and also conducted inter-
national visits to familiarise themselves with foreign systems. BetweenMarch and Septem-
ber 1971 the Committee visited Sweden, West Germany, Canada and the USA.100
Thehealthandsafety systems in thesecountriesworkedverydifferently to those inBritain,
althougheachhadpotential lessons tooffer theCommittee. In theUSA,PresidentNixonhad
recently signed theOccupational SafetyandHealthAct (OSHA)1970.Designed ‘toassure so
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions’, OSHAwas the first federal foray into occupational safety and health legislation,
such legislation having previously been worked out at state level.101 As in Britain, OSHA
was prompted over concerns about the rising level of industrial accidents: as of 1970,
14,000 American workers were killed at work each year. The Act established a general
duty for employers to provide employment free from recognised hazards, and enabled
the Secretary of Labor to promulgate standards developed through advisory committees
and national standard-making organisations, taking into account the views of interested
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parties.102 TheRobensCommittee considered the statutory approval of voluntary standards
an important regulatory tool, emphasising in its report that further weight should be
attached to them in future.103
Sweden offered other lessons. There, the Workers’ Protection Act had established
comprehensive statutory protection against occupational accidents and disease in 1949.
The same Act also provided for the appointment of safety representatives and joint safety
committees.104 Swedish arrangements for joint consultation were looked upon by British
trade unions particularly favourably in the 1960s, and were considered a possible model
for British arrangements, as industry’s commitment to establish safety committees was in
question. As a paper for the National Joint Advisory Council’s Industrial Safety
Sub-Committee remarked, ‘theSwedishexampleof safety delegates and safety committees
at work shop level seems to offer a workable system of compulsory joint consultation with
voluntary cooperation super-imposed.’105
Throughout its work, the Robens Committee was assisted by a Secretariat composed of
seconded civil servants, headed byMatthewWake of the Department of Employment (DE).
The Secretariat played a crucial role in organising the Committee’s work, preparing briefing
notes, arranging meetings and processing evidence. They acted as a vital link between the
Committee,whichwas essentially a ‘lay’groupof officials fromacross the political spectrum
(or those, like Robens, with limited experience), and those who had ‘on the ground’ experi-
ence of safety and health policy or practice. In the early stages of its work, the Committee
was also helped by the DE itself, which prepared several background documents to get
the Committee underway. The work of the Secretariat and DE in filtering and shaping the
Committee’s arguments has been little acknowledged by academic studies, which have
tended to focus on the published report itself. An analysis of the background documents
prepared for the Committee reveal just how influenced the Committee was by the views
and beliefs of its sponsoring department.
An early paper, for instance, advanced a view of the regulatory system thatwas automat-
ically accepted by the Committee, highlighting ‘the multiplicity of enforcing agencies, the
multiplicity and overlap of statutes, the distinction between safety and health of employed
persons and safety and health of members of the public, [and] gaps in the coverage of
the legislation’.106 The DE had been preparing comprehensive legislation since 1967, and
thus this interpretation gently prodded the Committee toward reforms under the DE’s
purview. An early review of evidence just six months into the Committee’s proceedings,
moreover, highlighted the Factory Inspectorate’s belief that ‘the existence of a mass of
detailed restrictive legislationmay inhibit the natural development of self-help and continu-
ous self-regulation by industry itself’.107 This was virtually identical to the Robens Commit-
tee’s eventual assertion, ‘the existence of such a mass of law has an unfortunate and
all-pervading psychological effect. People are heavily conditioned to think of safety and
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health atwork as in the first andmost important instance amatter of detailed rules imposed
by external agencies.’108
Oral evidencepresented to theCommitteealso suggests a cognitivebias—if unconscious—
towards the views of the DE and Factory Inspectorate. One of the first presentations deliv-
ered to the Committee was from the Chief Inspector of Factories, John Plumbe, who
repeated his assertion that the Inspectorate’s enforcementworkwas subject to diminishing
returns.109An increase inprosecution, Plumbesuggested,wouldbecounter-constructive to
health and safety, since it would ‘reduce the “public image impact” of prosecution action’.
Instead, the Inspectorate considered the law ‘a powerful reinforcement of their persuasive
functions… one tobekept in thebackgroundandusedas last resort’.110 This belief, of huge
importance to the subsequent enforcement of British health and safety regulation, received
no critical scrutiny from theRobensCommittee and found itsway directly into its report. The
idea that excessive legislation deterred or undermined individual responsibility, of course,
was a position entirely in agreement with Robens’ expressed ethos in Human Engineering.
On the other hand, theCommittee appears to have quickly dismissed the TUC’s view that
the government needed to devote more resources to accident prevention, increasing both
the number of factory inspectors and the level of fines imposed in court. In his oral evidence,
C. R. Dale, the Secretary of the TUC’s Social Insurance and Industrial Welfare Committee,
argued for a continuation of detailed, specific laws, because general requirements were
harder toenforce. Thequestion for theTUCwasnotwhether thebalancebetween statutory
and voluntary effortwas correct, butwhether they could be sustained: in his view, therewas
neither sufficient enforcement of the law, nor too many regulations.111 In contrast, the
Robens Committee argued that this view, based upon ‘an ever-expanding body of legal
regulations enforced by an ever-increasing army of inspectors’, was no longer tenable.112
Except for joint consultation, theRobensCommitteewasmore sympathetic toCBI propo-
sals, whichwere more in line with DE and Factory Inspectorate proposals as they had devel-
oped from 1967.113 First, the CBI argued that the proliferation of health and safety law
over time had obscured the common law duty of care; there needed to be an adjustment
in legislation to emphasise general duties. As a briefing paper submitted to the CBI’s
working party on the Robens Committee suggested,
What is wanted is not just new legislation but a completely new approach andmethod
of presentation centred upon the predominance of the basic common law principle
whichplaces responsibility onevery individual for reasonableconduct inhis relationship
with others.114
Second, the CBI concurred with the DE’s view that the growing mass of law was becoming
unintelligible, meriting urgent rationalisation. The CBI believed that an ‘enabling’ Act
expressing general principles would be more comprehensible to employers, with subordin-
ate regulationsdealingwith specificmatters.On safety committees, theCBImaintained that
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statutory compulsionwasunlikely towork, since it dependedupon ‘apositive desireonboth
sides of industry to work together for common objectives’.115 Indeed, CBI representatives
to theRobensCommittee argued that ‘“compulsory joint consultation”wasa contradiction
in terms’.116
The CBI’s oral evidence, alongside that of other parties, helps illuminate the initial consi-
derations that informed the Robens Committee. They aremore immediately revealing than
theminutes of the Committee itself, which tend to obscure points of contestation between
members, and concentrate on logistical matters, such as upcoming visits. However, the
minutes show that the Committee reached some of its most important decisions relatively
early in its proceedings. By January 1971, the Committee had already determined there
should be a new, comprehensive enactment applying to all employees, and there should
be renewed focus on better attitudes and responsibility at work; there were limits to what
legislation alone could achieve.117
The Committee’s report was published in July 1972, and brought together the various
ideas about accidents, regulation and the role of the state discussed so far. Its fundamental
argument was that the existing statutory and voluntary approach to safety and health at
work had reached its limit. The defects of the existing system were revealed not only by a
host of legislative and administrative problems, but also a disgraceful ‘humanitarian’ cost
of 1,000 fatalities and half a million injuries a year.118
TheCommittee portrayed a bloated, fragmented, reactive andoverly prescriptive system,
one that was outmoded and in urgent need of rationalisation. Not only had the existing
framework reached the limit of its comprehensibility to industry and government, but it
also undermined the initiative and ‘safety consciousness’ inspectors were trying to instil.
It was in this context that the Committee advanced its contentious argument that ‘the
most important single reason for accidents at work is apathy.’119
TheRobensCommittee acceptedwithout reservation the Factory Inspectorate’s view that
the existing statutory approach was becoming ‘counter-productive’.120 From this perspec-
tive, the further extensionof detailed health and safety lawwasno longerworkable: it could
not keep abreast of changes of industry and technology, and rapidly became obsolete.
These considerations lent support to the Committee’s primary conclusion, which was that
‘there are severe practical limits on the extent to which progressively better standards of
safety and health at work can be brought about through negative regulation by external
agencies. We need a more effectively self-regulating system.’121
The Committee’s proposed solution to this problem was a wholesale redistribution of re-
sponsibility away from statutory regulation, to ‘those who create the risks and those who
work with them.’122 In furtherance of this aim, informed by CBI and DE proposals, Robens
argued that the substance of the existing law should be revised and reconfigured under the
aegis of a single Act, applying to all workers and workplaces. This Act would express the
general principles of safety and health, but leave specifics, such as requirements for particular
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representatives, 29 September 1970.
117TNA LAB 96/481, Minutes of 18th meeting, 19
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industries andhazards, to subordinate regulations andcodesofpractice.123While regulations
(including prescriptive regulations imposing absolute duties) would still remain as part of a
suite of tools at the disposal of regulators, the emphasis was squarely on promoting safety
and health by non-statutory means such as codes of practice and guidance.124
Corresponding with this programme of legislative reform, Robens argued that the effi-
ciencyof statutory regulationcouldbe increasedbyunifying thevariousgovernmentdepart-
ments and inspectorates responsible for health and safety under one institution, the
National Authority for Safety and Health at Work. This Authority would be self-contained,
hived off from central government, and managed by a board composed of representatives
of trade unions, employers’ associations and other ‘user interests’.125 By reallocating re-
sponsibility away from the government to those groups with direct experience of industry
and working conditions, Robens institutionalised his philosophy of self-regulation in the
management of the new bodies established following the HSWAct.
Onenforcement, Robens’ recommendations strongly reflected the Factory Inspectorate’s
belief that legislation ‘should seek to promote, as much as to control’.126 Robens advised
against the use of prosecution for most offences under health and safety law, preferring
instead the use of new administrative sanctions, improvement and prohibition notices, to
encourage good practice. Indeed, the Robens Committee believed the role of the state
was to facilitate good practice, establishing and strengthening the arrangements through
which voluntary effort, or ‘self-regulation’ could thrive.
TheCommittee’s language clearly evoked the contemporary concerns about productivity
and poor industrial relations, reflecting the same notions of a disordered and inefficient
work environment Robens had expressed in Human Engineering. Arrangements such as
written safety policies were integral to raising standards, allocating responsibility and intro-
ducing a considered, scientific approach to accident prevention. Occupational safety and
health, the Committee asserted, was ‘an essential feature of good management’ and
needed to be treated as a ‘normalmanagement function’, inmuch the sameway asmarket-
ing or production. An efficient workplacewas onewhere everyone, from the boardroom to
shop floor, understood and carried out their responsibilities.127
This idea was intimately bound with the established voluntarist model of industrial
relations, which conceptualised an open and on-going dialogue between ‘capital’ and
‘labour’, in which the state did not directly intervene. Through this dialogue, it was
assumed, accident prevention would be afforded a higher, if not equivalent priority to
other items on the business or industrial relations agenda. This concept became encapsu-
lated in the Committee’s controversial remark that ‘There is a greater natural identity of
interest between “the two sides” [of industry] in relation to safety and health problems
than in most other matters. There is no legitimate scope for “bargaining” on safety and
health issues’.128
The Robens Report was supported by an extensive publicity campaign, in which Lord
Robens took to the television, newspapers and radio to explain his recommendations.
Overall, both sides of industry and the two main political parties welcomed the report.
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While theTUCandCBI disagreedwith the report’s stanceon specific issues, suchas the form
and content of new regulation, they felt that the report represented an advance over the
existing system. Writing for the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, for
example, Victor Feather argued that the Robens Report was an important step forward,
and history needed to remember its publication.129 The TUC and CBI were also willing to
overlook their differences to lobby for Robens’ proposals to be speedily enacted: following
the report’s publication, the TUC and CBI wrote a joint letter to Employment Secretary,
Maurice Macmillan, urging him to bring forward legislation as soon as possible.130 In the
same way, although the Labour and Conservative parties expressed differences over the
role of trade unions in appointing safety representatives, the HSW Act received bipartisan
support in Parliament and was passed by an incoming Labour government in July 1974
with only minor changes to a Bill presented by the Conservative Employment Secretary,
William Whitelaw, in January 1974.131
Nevertheless, the report received various criticisms in print and private. Commentators
such as Patrick Kinnersly, as we have seen, attacked Robens’ emphasis on ‘apathy’ and
his notion of an ‘identity of interest’ between employers and workers, that safety could
somehowbe divorced from the exigencies of industrial relations.132 TheGuardian reported
that by emphasising self-regulation, Robens placed ‘too much faith in human nature’.133
The Labour backbencher Neil Kinnock scoffed that the Robens philosophy effectively
meant ‘If we have less law, we shall have more safety.’134 Others, such as James Tye of
the British Safety Council, complained that the report had received little exposure at
all.135Othernewspapers,however, tookamoregenerous view,with theDailyMirror report-
ing how it formed ‘a real drive to improve [Britain’s] shaming record of human suffering and
economic loss’.136 What is apparent is that while contemporary criticisms against the
Robens Report were expressed, they were relatively few in number, and directed at specific
aspects of the Report rather than its overall recommendations. They do not appear to have
influenced the subsequent passage of the HSWAct in any meaningful way.
Instead, the Robens Report seems to have generated significant administrative problems
for Whitehall, with the Labour Employment Secretary Michael Foot remarking, on introdu-
cing the HSW Bill in 1974, that the report produced ‘a prolonged and intensive period of
interdepartmental consultation’.137 Theseproblemswere less a reaction to theReport’s em-
phasis on self-regulation than a response to its unifying approach and implications for the
machinery of government.138 Several departments, in particular the Department of the En-
vironment, resisted the demand that their safety andhealth functions should bedevolved to
a new quasi-independent authority. There were also questions about the status of
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inspectors andpolicymakers transferred to theagency:whether theywouldbe independent
of private interests, and whether they would continue to be civil servants. Fleshing out
Robens’ proposals between 1972 and 1974, officials ultimately created two new agencies
insteadof the singlenational authority envisagedbyRobens.139 TheHealthandSafetyCom-
mission (HSC) incorporated trade union, employer and public interests in the development
of national health and safety policy, andwere crown appointees, while officials working for
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) continued to be civil servants, enforcing the law,
undertaking research and publicity, and providing advice to the HSC. This institutional sep-
aration between interest-based policy making and enforcement continued in force until
2008, when the HSC effectively became the management board of the new unified HSE.
Conclusion
Despite the ascendancy of European health and safety law in recent decades, the HSWAct
continues to provide the legislative foundation for health and safety regulation in Britain to
this day, over 40 years after it was passed. Thus, the self-regulatory philosophy that crystal-
lised in the 1960s and early 1970s, and propagated by the Robens Committee, continues to
provide the conceptual framework within which occupational accidents and diseases are
visualised, legislation is viewed and the role of the state expressed. This is remarkable
considering the extraordinary changes that have occurred in the British labour market and
economic and political landscape since the 1960s, notably the decline in manufacturing.
To many in government and health and safety regulation, this longevity is testament to
the flexibility that underpins the ‘goal oriented’ and ‘risk based’ HSW Act.140 The system
Robens envisioned allows the law to be revised relatively quickly, in comparison with
before 1974, and keep abreast of technological and industrial change.
However, it is also remarkable that recent government reports, seeking to reduce the
‘burdens’ of health and safety regulation on business and operating within a deregulatory
context that has existed since at least the 1980s, have sought to recapture some of the ori-
ginal spirit of the Robens philosophy. In some respects, the report Reclaiming Health and
Safety for All, presented by the Professor of Risk Management, Ragnar Löfstedt, in 2011,
was no more than a restatement of the system’s founding principles.141
By laying bare the principles that underpin the HSWAct, this article has provided a foun-
dation for the historical study of health and safety in Britain after 1974. Since the HSWAct
structures and facilitates voluntary effort on the part of employers andworkers, these ideas
and assumptions need to be acknowledged for this voluntary effort, or ‘self-regulation’, to
be understood. This article therefore complements studies focusing on the behaviours and
attitudes of employers and workers in particular industries and workplaces.
However, this article has also shown how the post-1974 history of health and safety
cannot be separated from earlier efforts to prevent accidents and disease in the workplace:
the principles underpinning the current regulatory framework need to be considered
part of a longer evolutionary process, in terms of a regulatory system that has developed
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since theearly nineteenth century.Whilemanyof theseprincipleswere inherent to the regu-
latory philosophy of the pre-1974 Factory Inspectorate, the social, political and economic
context of the 1960s provided a unique set of circumstances that placed them at the
heart of the Robens Committee’s agenda: concerns about the incidence of accidents, prod-
uctivity, industrial relations and the diminishing returns of statutory effort. As such, the
current framework of health and safety regulation in Britain continues to embody a particu-
lar vision of regulation laid down at a particular moment, over 40 years ago. Health and
safety may appear a modern phenomenon, but in its contours—its shape, structure and
underlying ideas—it is distinctly middle-aged.
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